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Abstract
This paper contributes to the economic analysis of merger control by taking into account
the eﬃciency gains for the design of structural merger remedies when the competition author-
ities do not observe the magnitude of eﬃciency gains. We show that whenever divestitures
are necessary, the Competition Authority will need to extract from the merging partners
their private information on the merger’s eﬃciency gains. For this we propose a revelation
mechanism combining divestitures with two additional tools, the regulation of the divesti-
tures sale price and a merger fee. We show that an optimal combination of both instruments
is eﬀective: the most eﬃcient merged ﬁrms are claimed to pay a merger fee while the less
eﬃcient divest asets at an upwards distorted sale price.
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11 Introduction
Horizontal merger control requires the assessment of pro- and anti- competitive eﬀects of the
merger projects submitted. Among the former, the eﬃciency gains are crucial, since the merger
may be cleared if the merging partners manage to persuade the competition authority of sub-
stantial enough cost reductions. Otherwise, due to the market power increase, leading to higher
prices and even a lower welfare, the public authority may need to either prohibit the merger, or
at least impose merger ﬁxes or remedies. In short, either the merging ﬁrms are able to convince
the competition authority of high enough eﬃciency gains, or they run the risk of merger reme-
dies and even merger prohibition. Yet, the assessment of these eﬃciency gains leading to future
cost savings raises an information issue. Practitioners acknowledge an important information
asymmetry between merging ﬁrms and competition authorities. For instance, although the US
Merger Guidelines ascertain that "mergers have the potential to generate signiﬁcant eﬃciencies",
they also warn that "eﬃciencies are diﬃcult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the
information relating to eﬃciencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging ﬁrms"1.T h i s
information asymmetry is all the more relevant that ﬁrms have strong incentives to declare high
cost reductions so as to avoid merger remedies.
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the design of optimal merger divestitures when
merging ﬁrms are better informed than the competition authority with respect to the merger’s
eﬃciency gains.
To cope with this issue, competition authorities would try to extract this private information
on future eﬃciency gains. For that purpose, they may either call for a commitment from the
merging ﬁrms regarding the post-merger price under the threat of future monetary penalties, and
assess that commitment once the merger is completed (see Brodley (1996) for an example of such
a contingent remedy procedure). Or they may propose, as a condition for clearing the merger,
a menu of divestiture contracts meant to screen the diﬀerent types of merger projects according
to their welfare impact. We follow here the latter option, and provide a revelation mechanism
combining the use of divestitures with the regulation of their sale price and the payment of a
merger fee to the competition authority.
This idea requires a brief discussion of the opportunity to introduce new instruments in the
merger control process.
To start with, the payment of a lump-sum fee is quite common in regulatory situations,
where it is set by an industry regulator to regulate the access to scarce resources such as the
mobile phone spectrum.
As for the sale price of divested assets, for the time being antitrust agencies do not tamper
with it precisely because it is typically a regulator’s instrument. In practice, merging parties
1See the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/horiz_book/4.html
2are always given ﬁrst the opportunity to sell the remedy package at the best price and terms
they are able to negotiate with a potential purchaser, subject though to ﬁnal approval by the
competition agency. If they cannot complete the divestiture during the speciﬁed sale period, an
independent trustee is appointed to complete the sale at the best price and terms that, in the
trustees’ discretion, can be reasonably obtained to alleviate the competition concerns2.V a r i o u s
competition agencies argue that they should not interfere whatsoever in the pricing of assets to
be divested, and go as far as making clear that the assets will have to be divested at whatever
price, even if this means a very low one, even negative3.
Notwithstanding all this, our arguments in favour of such instruments within merger control
are twofold.
First, since divestitures alone may not suﬃce to screen merger proposals, it is natural to
look for complementary screening devices that might prove eﬀective. We examine here the very
scope for distorting the pricing of the divested assets and also for using a merger fee.
Secondly, merger control is a mixed area of antitrust and regulation, where the Competition
Authority is actually supposed to directly impact on the market structure by rejecting anti-
competitive mergers (Motta et al. (2002), p.2). Moreover, the scope of instruments employed
in merger control has constantly increased: the very structural remedies themselves have been
a c t i v e l ya n dp r o p e r l yu s e da sam e r g e rp o l i c yt o o lstarting only with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
in 19764. Furthermore, reactions from various competition authorities are not quite clear-cut
regarding “What role, if any, should a competition authority play in the pricing of assets to
be divested?"5. One competition agency in particular acknowledged its right to set a minimum
price if the parties are not successful in their attempts at divesting6. The regulation of the asset
divested price that we examine here would basically consist in explicitly adding a condition on
the assets’ price in the trustee’s mandate. Finally, the competition agency would rather interfere
with the price setting process, although maybe not quite ready to acknowledge it and in a diﬀer-
ent context: in the battle to force Microsoft to open up the market for media-playing software,
the European Commission seemed to ponder ordering a lower price for Windows without Media
Player7. More recently, in the telecoms industry, the European Commissioner Viviane Reding
decided to cap the price of roaming mobile phone communications8.
2See the FTC’s 2002 "Study Needed to Assess the Eﬀects of Recent Divestitures on Competition in Retail
Markets".
3See the OECD report on Merger Remedies, DAF/COMP(2004)21, December 2004.
4See the Baer and Redcay (2001) comments on the implications of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390
5See the OECD report on Merger Remedies, DAF/COMP(2004)21, December 2004, p.33.
6This is the Norwegian National Competition Authority - see page 217 of the OECD report on Merger Remedies,
DAF/COMP(2004)21, December 2004.
7The Wall Street Journal Europe, May 26, 2005.
8See the Financial Times,J u n e8 ,2 0 0 7
3Overview of results
We consider a simple framework with a three-ﬁrm pre-merger industry. Individual proﬁts
depend on the capital stock. Following a two-ﬁrm exogenous merger, the resulting merged entity
may enjoy cost savings. The latter stem from the synergies brought about by the merger, as
well as from the increase in the capital stock of the merged entity. The level of synergies diﬀers
from one merger project to another. When presented with a merger project, the competition
agency may require a merger ﬁx in the form of an asset sale to the outsider so as to fulﬁll its
objective. Such divestitures alter the distribution of capital assets between ﬁrms and thereby
the costs, proﬁts and industry price. We adopt a two-type framework, with an "eﬃcient" merger
project that can be cleared straightforwardly, and an "ineﬃcient" merger project that requires
asset divestitures from the point of view of the agency’s objective. However, such a remedy
reduces the proﬁt of the merging entity, hence the conﬂict between the public authority and the
ineﬃcient merger type, which lacks incentives to reveal its true type.
We argue that a combination of a merger fee and a regulated asset price for the divested
assets can be successfully employed as a screening device whenever both types of cost savings
are complements. There is complementarity within the merger proﬁt between synergies and the
capital stock cost savings if the higher the synergy, the higher the rise in proﬁt due to a marginal
increase in capital. We show that the competition authority proposes to the merged entity a
menu of two contracts. The ﬁrst contract consists of a no-divestiture merger combined with a
merger fee paid to the CA.T h esecond contract is an asset divestiture sold at a higher price than
the freely bargained price with symmetric information. To put it diﬀerently, the competition
agency clears the merger provided the merged entity pays a "licence to merge". The optimal
"licence" schedule takes two very diﬀerent forms. It is either an asset divestiture, or the payment
of a fee to the competition authority in exchange of a no-divestiture merger clearance.
Under the complementarity assumption, the eﬃcient merged entity value its capital more
than the ineﬃcient one does. Hence the screening pair of contracts where the ineﬃcient merger
type accepts to divest assets in exchange of a high price rather than pay a merger fee and merge
without structural remedies. The competition agency will make use of all three instruments. The
asset divestiture deals with the negative welfare eﬀect of the ineﬃcient type merger, whereas the
merger fee and the asset divestiture price regulation are used to increase the proﬁtability of the
merger with divestiture so as to induce the ineﬃcient insiders to accept the divestiture. For that
purpose, the competition authority exploits the positive externality the merger exerts on the
outsider’s proﬁtw h e nﬁxing the sale price and uses the merger fee whenever the manipulation
of the asset price is not suﬃcient, due to the constraint raised by the outsider’s maximum
willingness to pay.
4Finally, we examine the usefulness of the asset sale price regulation by comparing it with the
optimal merger control with the merger fee only and without asset price regulation.
Related literature
Our model actually provides, to our knowledge, the only existing formal treatment available
for the strictly informal intuition of Röller et al. (2001, p.216) who suggest to use merger license
fees as a revelation mechanism. The asymmetric information problem for merger control has
already been tackled though by Besanko and Spulber (1993) or Faulli-Oller and Corchon (1999).
Yet neither of these articles allow for merger remedies.
To our knowledge, few papers do. Barros et al. (2007) show in an empirical study that the
set of instruments used by a competition agency, including merger ﬁxes, deﬁne the severity of
the merger control policy and thus is likely to have a screening eﬀect. Our model takes on Rey
(2000), who suggests the possibility of divestitures, besides their corrective role, to be used for
screening. As compared with Gonzalez (2003), whose incentive mechanism relies on the choice of
the market where the divestiture will apply if accepted, we restrict the use of divestiture to the
same market on which the competitive harm occurs, and examine other revelation instruments.
The eﬀectiveness of our screening mechanism comes from exploiting the externality that the
merger conveys on the outsider. In that sense our paper is related to Fridolfsson and Stennek
(2005). In their framework, the introduction of asset divestitures allows the merging ﬁrms to
recover part of the outsider’s hold-up rent through the divested assets sale price. Thus, they
infer that such structural remedies may improve the welfare by hastening a proﬁtable merger or
even by making proﬁtable an initially unproﬁtable merger.
Next we present the model and the competition framework. For the design of optimal reme-
dies, we ﬁrst deﬁne the symmetric information benchmark. Then we deal with the information
asymmetry and perform the comparison between the asset price regulation and the merger fee.
Finally, we discuss our results with respect to alternative assumptions. All technical proofs are
grouped in the Appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
We present ﬁrst our general framework and basic assumptions. Then we develop an example
satisfying these assumptions.
2.1 Framework
Take a very simple setting with three identical ﬁrms competing on a given market. Firms’ proﬁts
depend on their capital or asset stock K (physical or immaterial capital, products, capacities,
5etc.). Consider now exogenous horizontal concentration on this market. Index the merged
entity, i.e. the insiders, by M, and the outsider by o, respectively. Following the merger, the
insiders hold the double (2K) of the pre-merger capital stock. The outsider’s capital holdings
are unchanged.
In our model, owning more capital lowers the cost of the merging ﬁrms. In addition, insiders
may also beneﬁt from some merger-speciﬁc cost savings or "synergies", measured by a parameter
denoted α.The parameter α measures the positive eﬀect of an essential complementarity between
the merger partners that allows them to further lower their common cost9. As Röller et al.
(2001) argue, such synergies typically arise from the complementarity between technological or
administrative capabilities of ﬁrms.
According to the law, merging ﬁrms need to submit their merger project for appraisal to the
public agency in charge of the merger policy, the competition authority (CA henceforth). Thus,
the post-merger market structure may be modiﬁed through the CA’s decisions and intervention.
Explicitly, the CA may require remedies under the form of asset divestitures in order to fulﬁl
its own merger control objective, which is taken here to be total welfare maximization. In
our setting, the divestitures will consist of asset transfers to the outsider, whom we suppose
here to be the only possible buyer. Moreover, we consider that the feasible asset divestiture
is unique10. Equivalently, we assume here that only ∆ units of capital can be divested to the
outsider (with ∆ <K ).D e n o t i n g δ the asset divestiture, this means that δ ∈ {0,∆}.W e
denote ΠM(δ,α) and Πo(δ,α) the ﬁrms’ proﬁts respectively when asset transfers apply. For
simplicity, we use a two-type model, with the synergy parameter α ∈ {α,α},w h e r eα stands
for the high cost entity and α for the low cost merged entity (α > α,s i n c eα measures the
synergies). The objective probabilities are ρ for the α type and 1−ρ for the α type respectively.
Denote by CS(δ,α) the consumers’ surplus after the merger. Thus total welfare after merger
equals W(δ,α)=CS(δ,α)+Πo(δ,α)+ΠM(δ,α).
2.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions hold:
H0: ΠM(0,α) ≥ 2Π for α = α,α, i.e. any merger without asset divestiture is proﬁtable.
H1: ∂
∂αΠM(δ,α) > 0, ∂
∂αΠo(δ,α) < 0, meaning that higher synergies beneﬁt the insiders but
hurt the outsider.
H2: 3Π ≤ ΠM(∆,α)+Πo(∆,α) ≤ ΠM(0,α)+Πo(0,α), so that the asset transfer from the
merged ﬁrm to the outsider leads to a decrease in the total industry proﬁt. Thus, following the
9For an explicit example of modeling cost savings through the use of complementary assets by merger partners
see Bensaid et al. (1994).
10In this we follow among others Motta et al. (2002), Vasconcelos (2005), and basically the European Commis-
sion guidelines on remedies that stress that an asset divestiture must be a viable set of activities.
6merger, there is no additional asset transfer likely to improve the proﬁto fbo t hﬁrms remaining on
the market. This assumption justiﬁes that the merger without divestiture is the most proﬁtable.




∂δ∂α < 0, which stands for the complementarity assumption between synergies and
capital cost savings: the higher the synergies, the higher the rise in proﬁt due to a marginal
increase in capital. Equivalently, the higher the synergies, the costlier the asset transfer.
H4: ∂
∂αW(δ,α) > 0, meaning that the merger synergies improve social welfare.
H5: W(∆,α) >W>W(α,0) and W(0,α) >W(∆,α) where W is the level of total welfare
if the merger is not carried-out. To avoid trivial cases, we only consider the cases where asset
divestitures prevent the welfare loss from an ineﬃcient merger11.
To sum up, horizontal mergers possibly lead to two opposite eﬀects: market power increase
on the one hand, but higher cost eﬃciency on the other. Divestitures might be used by the CA to
modify the post-merger market equilibrium to ma k ei tm o r ec o m p a t i b l ew i t ht h eC A ’ so b j e c t i v e
function. These divestitures would depend on the synergies as well as on the CA objective, and
their design is studied in the next section.
2.3 An example
Here is an example satisfying all ﬁve previous assumptions. Consider a homogenous good, three-
ﬁrm perfectly symmetric industry with linear demand P(Q)=1− Q,w h e r eP is the market
price and Q the total output. Firms maximize individual proﬁt and compete àl aCournot.
We consider an individual cost function developed by Vasconcelos (2005). Individual total cost
depends on the capital stock as follows: q·c(k),w h e r eq denotes the level of production and c(k)
is the marginal cost with c0(k) < 0 and c00(k) > 0. The total cost function of the merged entity
satisﬁes the following: q · cM(k,α),w h e r eα measures the amount of synergies. The marginal
cost cM(k,α) satisﬁes the following: ﬁrst, it is a decreasing and convex function of the capital
stock (
∂cM(k,α)
∂k < 0 and
∂2cM(k,α)
∂k2 > 0). Secondly, an increase in α reduces the marginal cost
(
∂cM(k,α)
∂α < 0). Finally, the cost reduction due to synergies increases with the capital stock
(
∂2cM(k,α)
∂k∂α ≤ 0). Such a cost function satisfying these assumptions is cM(k,α)=c(k) − α with
α ∈ [0,c(2K)].We show in the appendix that in this case, H1 to H5 are satisﬁed whenever the
level of synergy α is suﬃciently high and that of synergies α is suﬃciently low. Indeed, following
Farrel and Shapiro (1990), in a Cournot model the divestiture reduces the price and thus increases
the consumer surplus, but also increases the insiders’ cost. Thus, there are cases where due to
very high synergies, the insiders’ output is so high that the asset divestiture decreases the total
11For simplicity we assume also that asset divestiture is better than no asset divestiture: ρW(∆,α)+( 1−
ρ)W(∆,α) ≥ ρW(0,α)+( 1− ρ)W(0,α).
7welfare.
2.4 Merger control objective and instruments
We assume that the CA examines the merger projects based on the total welfare maximization
standard12.
In addition to the asset divestiture, we suppose that the public agency may charge a monetary
fee from the merged ﬁrms to allow them to merge. We denote F such a fee, which is assumed
to be costly, with one euro transferred to the CA costing the merging ﬁrms 1+λ euros (λ>0).
The parameter λ captures the distortion implied by the ﬁnancing of that monetary transfer.
Hence, the total welfare net of monetary transfer F to the CA following a merger of type α
with an asset transfer equal to δ becomes W(δ,α) − λF.
2.5 Timing of the game
Given the screening stand we take in our model, the game we consider between the ﬁrms and
the CA is the following:
At the ﬁrst stage, the merging ﬁrms learn their synergy level α and submit a merger
proposal to the CA. When information is symmetric α is also observed by the CA, but later on
we assume that parameter α is private information of the merging ﬁrms.
At the second stage, the CA evaluates the consequences of the merger taking into account
its own merger control objective. It proposes a divestiture contract accordingly, if such a contract
exists; if not, it rejects the merger. The divestiture contract will consist of an asset divestiture
δ,am e r g e rf e eF, and possibly a sale price P for the divested assets.
At the third stage, the insiders accept or reject the divestiture. If they accept, assets
will be transferred to the outsider. If the CA regulates the sale price of divested assets, then
the transfer takes place for this price. Otherwise, it obeys the following bargaining rule: with
probability β the merged ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it sale proposition to the outsider, and
with the complementary probability it is the outsider that makes an acquisition oﬀer on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis.
At the last stage, conditional on the divestiture contract being accepted, the market
equilibrium is determined taking into account the amount of asset transfer required by the CA.
The merger is abandoned whenever one of the parties rejects the contract.
This last assumption is quite in line with the current unfolding of a divestiture negotiation
process. Basically, for a divestiture to take eﬀect, it needs ﬁrst gain approval of all involved
parties: the divesting ﬁrms, the buyer, and the CA. The failure of such a three-party negotiation
12See Lyons (2002) and Neven and Röller (2005) for a discussion of the CA’s objective function.
8typically results either in the appointment of a trustee to carry out the divestiture, or in the
merger itself falling through.
3 Optimal divestitures with symmetric information
We examine here the case of symmetric information between ﬁrms and the CA, meaning that
the merger’s synergy level is public information. Hence at the second stage, the CA proposes a
divestiture contract according to the type of the merger. It consists of an asset divestiture (δ
for type α and δ for type α) as well as a monetary fee (F for type α and F for type α).T h eC A
can also reject the merger.
We determine next the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game deﬁned above.
At stage three, if the insiders commit to divest assets, then the outsider’s decision to accept
to take over the divested assets depends on his maximum willingness to pay for them, equal to
Πo (∆;α) − Π. By the same token, the minimum willingness to receive for the insiders is equal
to ΠM(∆,α) − 2Π. Thus, the expected price of divestiture by an insider of type α is equal to
β(Πo (∆;α) − Π)+( 1− β)(2Π − ΠM(∆,α)). In other words, with probability β the insiders
make a sale oﬀer for the maximum willingness to pay of the outsider, whereas with probability
1 − β the outsider makes oﬀers to buy the assets for the minimum willingness to receive of the
insiders. The parameter β captures the bargaining power of the insider.
At the second stage, since the CA observes the type of the merger submitted for approval,




W(α,δ) − λF (1)
s.t. ΠM(δ,α)+Πo(δ,α) − F ≥ 3Π
According to the constraint, the asset divestiture must increase the proﬁt of both the insider
and the outsider with respect to the non merger conﬁguration. This constraint ensures the
participation of both ﬁrms since the proﬁti n c r e a s el e a d sb o t hﬁrms to set a price compatible
with an increase in both proﬁts with respect to the non merger conﬁguration.
The following lemma provides the solution of the game described above.
Lemma 1 Let (δFB,FFB),(δ
FB
,F
FB) be the solution of the programme (S):
• for α = α, the merger is accepted without divestiture, δFB =0 , and without a merger fee,
FFB =0 .
• for α = α, the merger is accepted with divestiture, δ
FB
= ∆, a n dw i t hn of e e ,F
FB =0 .
The expected price of asset divested is PFB = β(Πo (∆;α)−Π)+(1−β)(2Π−ΠM(∆,α)).
9Basically, given our assumption that the ineﬃcient merger decreases the level of welfare
unless assets are transferred to the outsider, the optimal policy for the CA is to accept such
a merger conditionally on the asset divestiture. In turn, since we assume that the divestiture
reduces the welfare for the eﬃcient merger, the CA optimally clears it unconditionally. Finally,
since the CA observes the type of the merger, there is no reason to ask for a distorting merger
fee.
We now turn to the case where the CA does not observe the level of synergy α.
4 Optimal divestitures with asymmetric information: should as-
s e ts a l ep r i c e sb er e g u l a t e d ?
If the CA proposes the same couple of contracts as with symmetric information, we can show that
both types may prefer the no-divestiture contract. Explicitly, we derive the following lemma:
Lemma 2 There exists a threshold b β(α) ∈ [0,1] such that ΠM(0,α)−FFB > ΠM(∆,α)+PFB−
F
FB iﬀ β ≤ b β(α).
The choice of the divestiture contract leads to two opposite eﬀects on the insiders proﬁt.
According to H2, the asset divestiture lowers the industry proﬁt. Yet, the sale of the divested
assets allows the insider to capture, to a certain extent, the outsider’s proﬁt and thus to recover
some of the externality exerted by the merger. The extent of the externality capture depends
on the insiders’ bargaining power of the insider, hence the threshold b β(α). In our Cournot
example, there may be cases where b β(α)=1 , which means that despite the insiders having all
the bargaining power, there are still not enough incentives to make them divest assets.
H e r e a f t e rw ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r eβ ≤ b β(α), although there may be cases where the ﬁrst
best contracts may lead to self-selection.
The ineﬃcient type’s incentives not to divest make the CA either impose asset transfers to
both types or to broaden up the range of merger control instruments. We explore this latter
option next.
4.1 Optimal divestiture contracts with regulated asset sale prices
We propose here to endow the CA with two additional tools besides the asset divestiture in
order to improve the merger control in those cases where the symmetric information contract
is not incentive compatible. Explicitly, to clear mergers the CA will both set the price of the
assets divested and require a monetary fee13.
13We should note here that the payment following the sale of assets by the insiders to the outsider, is neutral.
We assume this to avoid that the total welfare depends on the bargaining process between ﬁrms. Nevertheless,
10The game with asymmetric information is thus basically the same as before, only taking into
account the changes due to the inobservability of the merger type and the new tools available
to the CA. The common priors of the CA and of the outsider on the insiders type are given by
the objective probabilities on α type (probability ρ) and on α type (probability 1 − ρ).
At stage four, the outsider observes the menu of contracts proposed by the CA, as well as
the contract chosen by the merged entity, and thus revises its prior beliefs.
Following the revelation principle we restrict to truthful direct revelation mechanisms, and
look for a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
The incentive contract ﬁxed by the CA will thus contain a merger fee F,a na m o u n to fd i v e s t e d
assets δ and a price P for the asset divestiture if it is positive. Two Incentive Constraints (IC
for type α and IC for type α) are added to the programme of the CA to induce revelation of
information. Hence, the programme of the CA writes:
max
{(δ,P,F),(δ,P,F)}
δ,δ∈{0,∆}, P, P, F≥0,F≥0







⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
ΠM (δ;α)+P − F ≥ ΠM ¡
δ;α
¢




+ P − F ≥ ΠM (δ;α)+P − F (IC)




+ P − F ≥ 2Π (PC
M)




− P ≥ Π if δ = ∆ (PC
o)
where the contracts (δ,P,F) and (δ,P,F) are destined for types α and α respectively. The
last four constraints are the participation constraints of the outsider for both contracts (PC
o
and PCo) as well as those of both types of insiders (PC
M and PCM). Since the contract we look
for induces information revelation, in equilibrium the priors of the outsider necessarily coincide
with his revised beliefs.
To achieve screening, the revealing contracts need to reconcile the often conﬂicting objectives
of the insiders and of the outsider, so as to ensure both industry ﬁrms’ participation. Thus
the above programme is actually designed to make the industry parties involved agree on the
incentive-compatible sharing of their total proﬁt.
Before presenting the optimal contracts we give the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Under H3, ΠM (δ1;α) − ΠM (δ2;α) > ΠM (δ1;α) − ΠM (δ2;α) for any δ1 <δ 2
we will show that the merger fee is useful despite this asymmetry between the monetary transfers to the CA or
among ﬁrms.
11This inequality stands for the standard single crossing condition. It states that the eﬃcient
merged entity beneﬁts more from a lower asset divestiture than the ineﬃcient one. In other
words, the eﬃcient merged ﬁrm values capital more than the ineﬃcient one. This result derives
from the complementarity between synergies and capital assumed in H3, according to which the
higher the synergy, the costlier the divestiture.
As in any standard Principal-Agent model, this lemma makes room for screening. We can











the divestiture contracts proposed with asym-
metric information, solution of the programme (AS). Under H1 to H5 and for β ≤ b β(α),t h e
following hold:
There exists a threshold b λ such that:
(i) For λ<b λ, we have δR =0and δ
R
= ∆. Prices and corresponding fees are P
R =
Πo(∆;α) − Π,P R = F
R =0and FR = Max(ΠM (0;α) − ΠM (∆;α) − P
R,0).
(ii) For λ>b λ, we have δR = δ
R
= ∆,F R = F
R =0as long as ΠM(∆;α)+ρ(Πo(∆,α)+
(1 − ρ)Πo(∆;α) ≥ 3Π. Otherwise, the merger is always prohibited.
This proposition states that as long as the social cost of the monetary transfer is low enough,
the CA optimally uses both additional tools at her disposal. In this case, the optimal contracts
have two main characteristics. First, as compared with the symmetric information case, the
divestiture is not distorted and the merger approval decision is unchanged. Second, the eﬃcient
merger pays a merger fee, whereas the price of assets divested by the ineﬃcient merger is upwards
distorted (P
R >P FB). To sum up, the eﬃcient insiders pay a fee in order to merge, whereas
the ineﬃcient insiders are granted an upward sale price distortion.
The intuition behind the design of these contracts goes in three steps.
So as to fulﬁll the CA’s objective, the CA can either request that asset divestiture whatever
the level of synergies claimed by the ﬁrms, or induce the ineﬃcient merger to divest the assets.
Secondly, it must be shown that the asset price distortion together with a merger fee makes
both ﬁrms choose the optimal divestitures given in Lemma 1. According to Lemma 3, a given
d i v e s t i t u r ei sm o r ed i s t o r t i n gf o rt h ee ﬃcient merged ﬁrm than for the ineﬃcient one. Thus, the
willingness to pay in order to avoid a given asset divestiture is higher for the eﬃcient merged
entity than for the ineﬃcient one. By the same token, the willingness to receive following the
asset sale is lower for the eﬃcient entity. Hence, to induce the ineﬃcient insiders to give up the
no-asset transfer contract, the CA ought to set a positive fee for this no-divestiture contract and
increase to the maximum the price in case of asset sale. Accordingly, it is enough to increase
the asset price to equal the willingness of the outsider, and set a positive merger fee, so as to
provide the right incentives. To sum up, our screening mechanism partly relies on the transfer
12of the merger externality from the outsider to the insiders through the asset price regulation.
Moreover, whenever this externality is not substantial enough, the CA must complement the
asset price regulation with the merger fee.
Finally, we need to show that the preceding contracts are more eﬃcient from the CA’s
point of view than applying divestiture for all merger projects. The social cost of the contracts
described above comes from the merger fee paid by the eﬃc i e n te n t i t yw h i l et h es o c i a lc o s to f
a pair of contracts requiring divestiture for both types is that of applying the asset divestiture
to the low-cost merged entity. Therefore, whenever the cost of public transfers is not too high,
it is more eﬃcient to have the eﬃcient merger pay a merger fee rather than resort to an even
more distorting asset divestiture.
Our proposition suggests that regulating the sale price of divested assets and requesting a
merger fee comes down to ﬁrms paying a kind of licence to merge, where the actual payment
varies according to the level of synergies. Basically, ineﬃcient insiders pay by giving up assets,
whereas the eﬃcient ones pay through a monetary fee to the CA. Hence, one way to interpret
our result is to consider that the CA oﬀers the insiders the choice between a monetary fee and
the appointment of a divestiture trustee that will enjoy full authority in the bargaining process
and only sell the assets at the highest possible price.
Note also that our result does not depend on the initial assumptions on the social cost of
merger fees and the neutrality of money transfers between ﬁrms14. Indeed, despite this potential
bias against the use of merger fees, we show that the optimal merger control induces the CA to
use this costly monetary transfer towards the CA, since the regulation of the asset price alone
does not make the ineﬃcient insiders accept the divestiture.
Finally, Proposition 1 raises the issue of the best instruments to address the anticompetitive
eﬀects of mergers. We argue that while price distortion is considered as highly intervention-
ist, and prohibited in an orthodox view of competition policy, within merger control the most
distorting tool is more likely to be the divestiture itself, rather than a lump-sum monetary
transfer between industry ﬁrms. Indeed, whereas the monetary transfers do not aﬀect the ﬁrms’
production decisions, the amount of divested assets does.
We have discussed here the case where the CA regulates both the sale price of the asset
divestiture and the merger fee. In Proposition 1, the optimal merger fee could be strictly
positive. This means that without such an instrument the optimal merger control would be less
14The absence of cost for the monetary transfers between ﬁrms impacts on the optimal regulated price. Never-
theless, we can easily show that even if the price gap with respect to the freely negociated price is costly, the asset
price regulation by the CA remains optimal. For instance, if the eﬃcient merger type is the most likely, it is less
costly to use the asset price regulation for the eﬃcient type rather than the merger fee payment by the eﬃcient
type.
13eﬃcient and would require the distortion of the asset transfer. One remaining question is the
usefulness of the other regulatory tool for the merger control. Unsurprisingly, the lack price
regulation, will lower the merger control eﬃciency since the regulated asset price is distorted.
Nevertheless, this setting is still worth examining, because with asymmetric information the sale
price has a signalling dimension and thus ineﬃciencies may be enhanced.
4.2 Optimal divestiture contracts without regulated asset sale prices
We examine the outcome of merger control without regulation of the asset price and we assess
its eﬃciency. As before mentioned, whenever the price is proposed by the insiders, this price
has a signalling dimension. Therefore, at the last stage the outsider updates his prior beliefs
according to the chosen contract as well as the price oﬀered by the insiders.
We examine the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game and we show the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the unregulated price game, the
following hold:
(i) The expected asset price PUR is such that PFB ≥ PUR and the corresponding optimal
merger fees are the following: F
UR =0and FUR = Max(ΠM (0;α)−ΠM (∆;α)−PUR,0) ≥ F
R.
(ii) The expected welfare is reduced as compared with the asset price regulation case.
Lack of asset sale price regulation reduces the expected welfare. The ineﬃciency stems from
the unregulated asset price being lower than the regulated one. As a result, in order to induce the
ineﬃcient merger to accept the asset divestiture, the CA is constrained to oﬀset this lower price
b yah i g h e rm e r g e rf e ei ft h eﬁrm chooses not to divest assets. Moreover, the asset sale price can
be even lower than its symmetric information level, meaning that the current ineﬃciency is not
merely due to an asset price unchanged with respect to the symmetric information situation. The
asymmetric information combined with the lack of asset price regulation amplify the ineﬃciency
of the merger control.
The asset price is now lower than the regulated price on account of two reasons.
First, the bargaining position of the insiders prevents them from capturing the whole will-
ingness to pay of the outsider, as the CA does through price regulation.
Secondly, there are equilibria where the asset sale price is even lower than the symmetric
information level. This is due to the asymmetric information between the outsider and the
insiders. If that for the symmetric information price level the outsider believes that the assets are
sold by an eﬃcient ﬁrm, then the outsider does not buy them. Thus the insiders are constrained
to sell at a lower price, and therefore the corresponding merger fee needs to be higher.
14We show in the appendix that such beliefs are not reasonable according to the Cho and
Kreps (1987) criterion. Nevertheless, the regulation of the sale price turns out to be the best
way for the CA to induce the outsider to agree on a sale price that allows the lowest merger fee,
and this is more eﬃcient from the welfare point of view.
Note that both instruments, if employed alone within merger control, lead to an extra cost
w.r.t. the case where both are used simultaneously. Hence the comparison between these
instruments comes down to a comparison of their relatives costs: distortion of the asset transfer
if the sale price is regulated but no fee is used, and a merger fee raise if the sale price is not
regulated.
5 Optimal merger control under alternative assumptions
We discuss in this section the robustness of our main result displayed in Proposition 1 with
respect to our main assumptions.
T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h eC A .
We adopted in the present paper a total welfare objective. Yet the literature hosted a sharp
debate on the actual objective of the CA for merger control.
If the CA adopts a consumer surplus criterion to clear a merger, the contract described
in proposition 2 would still be optimal to the extent that the asset divestiture improves the
consumer surplus for the ineﬃcient merger only. A second possible decision rule is based on
the lexicographic criterion. It consists in maximizing the proﬁto ft h em e r g i n gﬁrms, provided
that the consumer surplus is not reduced15. Again, as long as the asset divestiture prevents a
consumer surplus decrease for the ineﬃcient merger, the optimal contract is the same as the one
in Proposition 1. First, the CA gives incentives to the ineﬃcient merger type to divest assets,
and then it sets the merger fee to the minimum and the asset price to the maximum, which
leads to the maximization of the merging ﬁrms’ total proﬁt.
Substitutability between capital and synergies
Assumption H3 states that the higher the synergies, the higher the proﬁt gain due to a
marginal increase in capital. The single crossing condition in Lemma 3 derives from that as-
sumption. Assume instead that capital and synergies are substitutes: the higher the synergies,
the lower the marginal impact of capital on proﬁt. Then the willingness to pay in exchange for
t h en o - d i v e s t i t u r ec o n t r a c ti sh i g h e rf o rt h ei n e ﬃcient type than for the eﬃcient one. Therefore,
15See Lyons and Medvedev (2007) for this objective function, which is basically the translation of both the EU
and US merger guidelines.
15if the ineﬃcient type is induced to divest assets, then the eﬃcient ﬁrm is also induced to do so,
following our Lemma 2. This yields a non responsiveness case (Laﬀont and Martimort (2001)),
where the CA’s objective to provide divestiture incentives only to the ineﬃcient insiders con-
ﬂicts with their merger gains. As a result, the optimal contract pools both types and consists
in requiring the asset divestiture with no price regulation and no merger fee whatever the level
of synergies.
Information and merger control.
In order to implement the optimal contract in Proposition 1, the CA needs to know the
whole model, and in particular the proﬁts of both the insiders and the outsider. We only assume
that the insiders’ post-merger synergy level is not perfectly observed.
Yet one can easily imagine that the outsider’s willingness to pay for the divested assets
depends on the own level of eﬃciency of that outsider, and as such it is not publicly known.
But then the merger would not take place if the CA sets a price so high that the merger is
not proﬁtable for the outsider. As a result, the CA would have to leave a rent to the most
eﬃcient outsider. Again, this lower asset price will lead the CA to increase the merger fee so as
to still satisfy the incentive constraint of the ineﬃcient insiders. In other words, the asymmetric
information between the CA and the outsider would make the CA rely even more on the merger
fee. Sale price regulation remains nevertheless relevant to ensure that the target insiders divest
assets, although allowing now only a partial capture of the outsider rent.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The choice of optimal asset divestitures for merger control is likely to face informational issues
concerning the level of merger synergies. We examine here the possibility for the CA to use
additional instruments: a merger fee paid to the CA as well as the price regulation for the
divested assets. We show that these instruments complement each other. More precisely, the
more eﬃcient merger project is induced not to divest assets but will pay a positive merger fee,
while the ineﬃcient merger project is on the contrary given incentives to divest assets by means
of an upwards distortion of the sale price of divested assets, with no merger fee. We also assess
the eﬃciency of the merger control based on the merger fee only, as would be the case if the CA
is reluctant to use the asset price regulation instrument.
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7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Assumptions H0 to H5 in the Cournot example
• The merger without asset divestitures
In the Cournot model with constant marginal cost and linear demand, we can easily show
the following properties:
(i) Total welfare W(0,α) increases with the level of synergies α
(ii) The proﬁt of the outsider decreases with α, the proﬁt of the insiders increases with α and
the industry proﬁti n c r e a s e sw i t hα.
(iii) There exits a unique level of synergies α1 such that for any α>α 1 we have ΠM(0,α) > 2Π
(the merger is proﬁtable) and ΠM(0,α)+Πo(0,α) > 3Π (total proﬁt in the industry increases).
(iv) There exists unique level of synergies α2 >α 1 such that for any α>α 2, total welfare
increases: W(0,α) >W
Hence for any α >α 2 > α>α 1 our assumptions H0, H1 and H4 are satisﬁed.
• The impact of asset divestitures on proﬁts and total welfare
- Asset divestitures and ﬁrms proﬁts.
According to assumption H2, the asset divestitures reduce the industry proﬁt . T h ei m p a c to f



























3 is the quantity produced by the insiders, qo(δ,α)=
1−2c(K−δ)+cM(2K−δ,α)
3 is the quantity produced by the outsider. The term R(δ) is the total
revenue of the industry (qM(δ,α)+qo(δ,α))P(qM(δ,α)+qo(δ,α)) and A+B assesses the impact
of the divestiture on total cost. Basically A assesses the eﬀect of the divestitures on the total
cost for unchanged allocation of production and B captures the impact of the reallocation of
production on the total cost. Let us determine the sign of each term:
-Term R0(δ):i fcM(k,α)=c(k) − α, total revenue decreases with δ since the price decreases
with δ. We have R0(δ) < 0.
-Term A:w eh a v ea l w a y sqM(δ,α) >q o(δ,α), because of cost advantage of ﬁrm M. Thus there
always exists a function c(k) such that
³
qoc0(K − δ) − qM ∂cM(2K−δ,α)
∂k
´
> 0. Hence A<0.




∂δ . Therefore B<0. Asset
divestitures increase the level of production in the least eﬃcient ﬁrm and thus the impact is
negative.
A c c o r d i n gt oa s s u m p t i o nH 3(
∂2ΠM(δ,α)
∂δ∂α < 0), the higher α, the higher the distorsive impact of
asset divestitures on the insiders proﬁt. We can show that as long as ∂2cM











- Asset divestitures and the total welfare
According to assumption H5, the asset divestitures (i) reduce the total welfare for the most
eﬃcient merger type (α)i . e . W(∆,α) <W (0,α) and (ii) increase total welfare above the
pre-merger level for the least eﬃcient merger type (α) i. e. W(∆,α) >W .





c0(K + δ)(3qo + qM) −
∂cM(2K−δ,α)
∂k (qo +3 qM)
i
As explained by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), the divestiture has two opposite eﬀects. On the
one hand, it reduces the sum of marginal costs and thus tends to increase the welfare. On the
other, it increases the marginal cost of the insiders that produce more than the outsider, and
this tends to decrease the welfare. Therefore, the higher the level of synergies, the lower qo(δ,α)
and the higher qM(δ,α) and thus the likelier the negative total eﬀect of the divestiture on the
welfare. Therefore for α high enough, we have
∂W(δ,α)
∂δ < 0, meaning W(∆,α) <W(0,α).
(ii) Any asset divestitures do not ensure a welfare increase above the pre-merger level for
the least eﬃcient merger type. However, we show here that there exists an asset divestiture
∆ that ensures such an increase. Let us consider that ∆ leads the price unchanged after the




4 . In that case the consumer
surplus is unchanged with respect to the pre-merger level. The total proﬁts increase since total
revenue are unchanged and both marginal costs decrease: for the outsider c(K +∆) <c (K) and
19for the insiders cM(2K − ∆,α) <c (K).
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 is a direct consequence of assumption H5 according to which W(∆,α) <W(0,α) and
W(∆,α) >W .Hence the optimal divestiture is asset divestitures for the type α merger i. e.
δ
FB
= ∆ and no divestiture for the type α i. e. δFB =0 . Moreover, since any transfer to the
CA is costly, the optimal merger fees are both equal to zero: FFB = F
FB =0 . Finally, from the
discussion preceding the lemma, the expected price for the asset divestiture by the ineﬃcient
merger type is PFB = β(Πo (∆;α) − Π)+( 1− β)(2Π − ΠM(∆,α)).
7.3 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Existence of b β(α).
ΠM(0,α) − FFB > ΠM(∆,α)+PFB − F
FB is equivalent to β<
ΠM(0,α)−2Π
Πo(∆;α)+ΠM(∆,α)−3Π.
We deﬁne b β(α)=Min(1,
ΠM(0,α)−2Π+ΠM(∆,α)−ΠM(∆,α)
Πo(∆;α)+ΠM(∆,α)−3Π ). N o t et h a ta c c o r d i n gt oH 0a n dH 2 ,
b β(α) > 0.
(ii) Level of b β(α) in the Cournot example
We show that in the Cournot example b β(α)=
ΠM(0,α)−2Π
(Πo(∆;α)+ΠM(∆,α)−3Π) could be equal to 1.
Consider, for instance, the case where the asset divestiture applied to the merger of type α leads
to a price unchanged with respect to the pre-merger conﬁguration.
If we denote by q the pre-merger quantity produced by any one ﬁrm, then:
ΠM(∆,α)+Πo(∆,α)=3 qP(3q) −
¡
2qcM(2K − ∆,α)+qc(K + ∆)
¢




If the total production cost increases with δ (it is the case for instance in the Cournot example










As a result: b β(α) > 1.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 3





Hence for any δ we have also ∂
∂δ
¡
ΠM (δ;α) − ΠM (δ;α)
¢
< 0.
Therefore ΠM (δ1;α) − ΠM (δ2;α) > ΠM (δ1;α) − ΠM (δ2;α), for any δ1 <δ 2.
207.5 Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst determine the best separating contract, then we compare it with the best pooling
contract and we deduce the optimal contract. We focus here on β<b β(α) since otherwise the
ﬁrst best contract satisﬁes the incentive constraints.
• The best separating contract
The best separating contract requires an asset divestiture for the type α and no divestiture
for the type α. The contracts proposed by the CA are thus (0,F,0) for the eﬃcient type and
(∆,F,P) for the ineﬃcient type.
Therefore, the constraints become:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
ΠM (0;α) − F ≥ ΠM (∆;α)+P − F (IC)
ΠM (∆;α)+P − F ≥ ΠM (0;α) − F (IC)
ΠM (0;α) − F ≥ 2Π (PCM)
ΠM (∆;α)+P − F ≥ 2Π (PC
M)
Πo (∆;α) − P ≥ Π (PC
o)
Total welfare decreases with F and does not depend on P. Therefore, optimal distortions must
be such that:
(i) P must be set at its maximum provided that (PC
o) is satisﬁed i. e.: P
PR = Πo (∆;α) − Π
(ii) F and F must be set at their minimum provided that (IC) is satisﬁed i. e. F
PR =0and
FPR = Max(ΠM (0;α) − ΠM (∆;α) − P
PR,0)
The participation constraint (PCM) is satisﬁe ds i n c ew eh a v eΠM (0;α) − FPR ≥ ΠM (∆;α)+
P
PR ≥ 2Π.





ΠM (0;α) − ΠM (∆;α) − Πo (∆;α)+Π,0
¢¤
+( 1− ρ)W(∆,α)
• The best pooling contract
The best pooling contract consists in requiring asset divestiture since we assumed (footnote 14)
that the expected welfare is maximized with asset divestiture rather than without divestiture.
Here there are no incentive constraints. Hence merger fees are equal to 0: F = F =0 . The asset
price P must satisfy the participation constraint of the ineﬃcient type merger, ΠM(∆,α)+P ≥
2Π,a sw e l la st h ep a r t i c i p a t i o no ft h eo u t s i d e r :ρΠo(∆,α)+( 1− ρ)Πo(∆,α) − P ≥ Π
This is possible as long as ΠM(∆;α)+ρ(Πo(∆,α)+( 1− ρ)Πo(∆;α) ≥ 3Π. Otherwise, the CA
is to prohibit the merger.
• The optimal contract
21So as to determine the optimal contract we compare the expected welfare with the best separating
contract and the best pooling contract. The expected total welfare for the separating contract
decreases with λ. Moreover, by assumption the separating contract leads to a higher expected
welfare for λ =0 . Hence the existence of a threshold b λ on this parameter such that below b λ the
separating contract maximizes the expected welfare.
In short:
-f o rλ ≤ b λ, the optimal contracts are: P
R = Πo (∆;α) − Π, F
R =0 , δ
R
= ∆,P R =0 ,δ R =0
and FR = Max
¡
ΠM (0;α) − ΠM (∆;α) − Πo (∆;α)+Π,0
¢
.
-f o rλ>b λ, the optimal contracts are P
R = PR, F
R = FR =0and δ
R
= δR = ∆ with PR
satisfying the participation constraints. Such a price exists as long as ΠM(∆;α)+ρ(Πo(∆,α)+
(1 − ρ)Πo(∆;α) ≥ 3Π.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst prove points (i) and (ii) of proposition 2. Then we apply the Cho and Kreps (87)
criterion to the equilibria.
• Existence of Perfect Bayesian equilibria with PUR <PFB
The CA proposes two contracts: (∆,F) and (0,F). The price of assets divested is set according
to the bargaining rule. The expected price, denoted by PUR, is equal to PUR = βPM+(1−β)Po
where Po denotes the price proposed by the outsider and PM the price proposed by the merged
ﬁrm. If the price is proposed by the insiders, the beliefs of the outsider on the merger type
depend on the contract chosen as well as on the price proposed by the insiders. We denote by
γ(δ,F,PM) the probability that the insiders are of type α if the insiders propose a price PM
and γ(δ,F) otherwise.
Let us describe an equilibrium where PUR <PFB.
Consider a threshold x lower than the outsider’s willingness to pay for the assets if the insiders
are of type α and higher than the willingness to pay if the insiders are of type α: Πo(∆,α)−Π <
x<Πo(∆,α) − Π, and consider the following beliefs:
- for any price PM with PM >x ,the outsider believes the assets are divested by the eﬃcient
type: γ(∆,F,PM)=1 .
- for any price PM with PM ≤ x, the outsider believes the assets are divested by the ineﬃcient
type: γ(∆,F,PM)=0 .
We look for a separating equilibrium where only the type α divest assets and therefore at the
equilibrium we have γ(0,F)=1and γ(∆,F)=0 .
22Determination of PUR
For the beliefs described above, the optimal price proposed by the insiders, PM, is x.
The outsider proposes a price Po that satisﬁes the participation constraint of the insiders:
Po =2 Π − ΠM(∆,α)+F.We have then PUR = β(2Π − ΠM(∆,α)+F)+( 1− β)x.
The type α incentive constraint:
If the insiders of type α choose the contract (0,F), the proﬁte a r n e di sΠM (0;α) − F
If the insiders of type α choose the contract (∆,F), the proﬁte a r n e di sΠM (∆;α)+PUR− F.
The CA optimally sets F
UR =0and FUR that satisﬁes the incentive constraint of the insiders
of type α: ΠM(∆,α)+PUR = ΠM(0,α) − FUR.
The type α incentive constraint:
If the insiders of type α selects the contract (0,F), the proﬁte a r n e di sΠM (0;α) − F
If the insiders of type α selects the contract (∆,F), the proﬁte a r n e di sΠM (∆;α)+PUR− F
By lemma 3, the insiders of type α are induced not to divest assets.
We conclude that the initial beliefs are consistent since the insiders of type α never divest assets
and the type α proposes a price x.
We deduce that at the equilibrium: PUR <β (2Π−ΠM(∆,α))+(1−β)(Πo(∆,α)−Π)=PFB <
P
R.
As a result, because of the social cost of F, the expected welfare is lower than with asset price
regulation.
• Equilibria with PUR <PFB and the intuitive criterion
We apply the Cho and Kreps (87) "intuitive criterion" on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that support
equilibria where PUR <PFB.
Consider the equilibrium fully described in the above paragraph. For any price PM higher than
the equilibrium price x,b e l i e f sm u s tb es u c ht h a tγ>0 in order to prevent the deviation of the
ineﬃcient merger type. However, as far as the eﬃcient merger type is concerned, to divest assets
at a price slightly higher than x is not proﬁtable. In other words, even though the insiders of
type α could sell the assets at a price higher than x, the deviation is not proﬁtable. According
to the Cho and Kreps (1987) criterion, any reasonable beliefs must be such that γ =0 .
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